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Elleper Johnson
17 May 1962

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE
21 MAY - 30 JUNE 1962

<u>TASK</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>POLITICAL</u>		
1. Obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime. (STATE)	To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.	Members of OAS need to be inspired to push some special action through. Current events offer a number of opportunities for exploitation through such OAS bodies as the <u>Commission on Human Rights</u> , the <u>Peace Committee</u> , the <u>Council of Jurists</u> , and the <u>Children's Institute</u> , as well as the <u>Special Consultative Committee on Security</u> .
2. Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban workers, students, farmers, and freedom. (STATE)	To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.	Under the Ambassador's initiative, each Country Team by now has the means to generate more open and active commitment of Latin American political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, and military leaders. One significant action in each Latin American country, for hard impact on Cuba, is a minimum need.

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CONSIDERATIONS

POLITICAL - continued

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PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

POLITICAL - continued,

4. **Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political-economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (STATE)**

For the guidance of Operation Mongoose personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed to acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Cuba.

There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including drafts by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffs.

5. **Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA)**

These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have purposeful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project.

CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated management. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (STATE)

To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public.

This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply geared to the project's operations, including consideration of declassifying material for operational use. Defense should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assume leadership.

7. Make strong, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Cuba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Cubans. (USIA)

To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons of the regime's bureaucracy.

This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors, as dramatic witness against the Castro-Communist regime. (USIA)

To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemisphere.

Note the inclusion of defectors in this task; it is still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardona's intensely moving statement at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama, "Anatomy of Betrayal."

9. Ready the "Voice of Cuba" for radio broadcast. (CIA)

To provide a ready capability for giving a "voice" to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime.

Initially, this would be for brief news broadcasts of local events inside Cuba, simulating a location in Cuba, but actually [REDACTED] A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision.

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
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CONSIDERATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

[10.]



[11.]

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CONSIDERATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

12.



13. Create musical and visual symbols to express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA)

To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime.

New words to favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as "V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on CIA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

14. Select a sabotage operation.
(CIA)

To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resistance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resistance.

CIA should select a feasible sabotage operation, a "showy" one against the regime, but not against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval.

INTELLIGENCE

15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA)

To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is adequate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions.

Feasibility depends on CIA's judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The schedule was for 14 teams, 2 singleton agents, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] by the end of May.

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INTELLIGENCE - continued

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TASKS**PURPOSE****CONSIDERATIONS****INTELLIGENCE - continued**

18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA)

To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed.

Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA mount such operations with Cuban [REDACTED] personnel, an acceptable means must be found promptly. CIA, with Defense assistance, as a priority will review feasible means of mounting these operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision.

MILITARY

19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA)

To assure that skills needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made.

While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anticipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible introduction in September, it is known that at least 3 months "lead time" is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of far more help than called upon at present. Also, it is possible that further policy guidance might be required.

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MILITARY - continued

20. Induct Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces for training. (DEFENSE)

To fulfill Cuban exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future military action inside Cuba.

ECONOMIC

21. Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (STATE)

To further restrict Cuba's economy.

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ECONOMIC - continued

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